

**Support for Propaganda:
Perceptions of Public Service Advertising by Beijing Residents**

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* For fruitful research collaboration we would like to thank Shen Mingming, Yan Jie, and Chai Jingjing from the Research Center of Contemporary China and Song Houze from Unirule. For insights, suggestions, comments, and criticisms we are grateful to Liu Linqing, Martin Whyte, Tianjian Shi, Tang Wenfang, Christopher Neal, Pan Jian, and Carsten Hoppe. This paper is part of a joint research project between Leiden University and Communication University of China, funded by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). We are also grateful for financial support from Whitman College.

Abstract

This paper utilizes focus groups conducted among Beijing residents to examine perspectives of public service advertisements on television. Beijing residents see public Service advertisements, a common form of propaganda, as more trustworthy than commercial advertisements, and are surprisingly supportive of state efforts to guide public attitudes. Public opinion survey data from thirty Chinese cities confirm key findings emerging from the focus groups.

Introduction

The government of the People's Republic of China is noteworthy for its capacity to control political information and ability to employ modern marketing strategies to remake propaganda and, thereby, disseminate compelling messages to a broader political audience. Yet little research has been done to evaluate the extent to which the public supports government sponsorship of propaganda designed to educate people via the mass media. Utilizing focus groups conducted with long-term Beijing residents in 2009-2010, this paper examines Chinese preferences concerning "authoritarian communication," or state-sponsored efforts to guide public opinion in combination with efficacious suppression of alternative political views. Public opinion survey data is used to test the representativeness of our focus groups findings.

Unlike prior research on Chinese politics that considers how entrepreneurs or the middle class views the authoritarian state and democratic governance (Chen and Dickson 2008, Cheng 2010), our paper focuses on how perceptions of a common type of state propaganda—public service advertisements broadcast on television – differ by age, education, and gender. The rapid transformation of Chinese society as a result of the reforms has resulted in strikingly different attitudes between age groups (see, for example, Tang 2005) and education has been found to constitute a key indicator for trust and satisfaction in the Chinese political system (see, for example, Kennedy 2009).

Gender differences tend to be less explored in research on Chinese public opinion and we originally did not expect to find strong attitudinal differences between women and men. As we conducted the first two focus groups, however, we noticed striking differences between less educated women and men, which we could later replicate when separating women and men in the statistical analysis of survey data.

Contrary to the notion that citizens living under authoritarianism hunger for freedom of speech and the press, our study revealed considerable public support for propaganda designed to increase patriotism, combat corruption, and heighten awareness of environmentalism. In the eyes of Beijingers, airing public service advertisements (PSAs) on television was preferable to commercial advertising, which was viewed darkly by many and with skepticism by some. Interestingly, nearly all of the participants in our study showed a weak understanding of the process through which public service advertising is produced, funded, and broadcast on television. Moreover, few people grasped who is authorized to make PSAs and what their purposes in doing so might be, though they understood that PSAs generally constituted a form of propaganda. Despite people's lack of understanding of the production and origin of PSAs, urban Chinese believe in the merits of propaganda for elevating moral standards and heightening awareness of social problems.

Legacy of Leninism

Since the Chinese Revolution the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have adapted Soviet-style information control to seize power and unite a large and ideological pluralist country. Lenin believed media were tools for advancing the cause of a vanguard party, which represented the proletariat, and thereby society as a whole

(Esarey 2006). In the People's Republic, party domination over propaganda has been referred to as the *dangxing yuanze* or "party principle:" media are subordinate to the party and subject to guidance, in terms of content and operations (Zhao 1998).

Under Mao Zedong, mass media transmitted ideology via propaganda designed to guide thoughts and actions of all members of the party and all citizens. In the Reform Period, as the post-Mao era is called by sinologists, the CCP's propaganda apparatus was rebuilt to improve the capacity of media to attract audiences and to reshape the attitudes and actions of Chinese citizens. Through media management strategies adopted from the West, the CCP transmitted its revisions to state ideology, fostered patriotic education, and restricted the consideration of alternative political and economic policies (Lynch 1999, Brady 2008). In the Reform Period, adherence to regime ideology was supposed to be primarily enforced by means of positive incentives rather than coercion, as was the case during the Mao Period (Manion 2004).

In the Reform Period, the People's Republic has harnessed the tools of mass communication to construct an environment in which party and state organizations sought to control newspapers and magazines, a national wire service, radio and stations, television stations, film studios, websites, blogs, social networks, and cellular phones. (Lynch 1999; Brady 2008). As the primary means through which citizens obtain political information, mass media have entertained as well as educated the public concerning "proper" political thoughts and behavior. At the same time, internet use has increased the citizenry's access to alternative information sources unmediated by the state. Due to China's dynamic socio-economic change in recent decades, and increasingly pluralistic information environment, make the evaluation of the extent to which Chinese are

receptive to, and even supportive of, state propaganda an essential topic for scholarly consideration.

The party-state employs many means to guide public opinion. Public service advertisements broadcast on television (henceforth PSAs, *gongyi guanggao*, in Chinese) are an important and understudied form of propaganda. State and party units at different levels of government rely increasingly on political advertising, primarily on television, in order to substitute for more traditional ways of political communication, such as films and propaganda posters. In the past, public service advertising was directed at building a modern set of values and norms or “spiritual civilization” in order to hold together an increasingly diverse and fragmented society. In practice, however, PSAs have become part of a wide range of state efforts to fight corruption, improve treatment of migrant workers, protect the environment, improve knowledge of laws and regulations, and promote a positive image of the National People’s Congress.

PSAs air during on national and local television and reach an estimated 75 percent of the rural and around 80 percent of China’s urban population (Stockmann 2011). A CTR market research study conducted between January and July of 2009 found that 67 percent of government-initiated PSA aired on municipal television stations, 24 percent on provincial stations, and 5 percent on China Central Television. Television stations throughout China broadcast PSAs that are designed to elevate awareness of political and cultural topics of local and national importance.¹ Yet the public’s perception of PSAs in China remains uncertain. Chinese leaders are convinced that political commercials are well perceived by the Chinese public and, therefore, are a useful form of propaganda.

¹ These PSA include advertising initiated by party or state units but PSA financed by corporation, thus underestimating the percentage of PSA actually broadcast. *Zhongguo Guangbo Yingshi* (China Radio Film & TV) Magazine, December 2009.

Data and Research Methods

Since the development of focus group methodology in the 1940s, scholars have demonstrated its utility for understanding responses to media programming and encouraging self-disclosure on sensitive topics (Merton, 1986; Ward et al, 1991). Focus groups are capable of eliciting data that is difficult to obtain through surveys, which focus rigidly on prescribed topics. Focus groups have also served as means for the generation of ideas for quantitative testing and as a valuable instrument of discovery (Lunt 1996: 80); these two qualities were of particular value to our research due to the lack of existing research on PSAs and perception of propaganda in China.

Our focus groups relied upon samples of ordinary citizens recruited by the Research Center of Contemporary China at Peking University. Due to the large number of migrants in China we included people without a Beijing residency permit (*hukou*) in each focus group. The reason by we wanted to learn the views of a broad sample of ordinary citizens, and not particular social groups, was that over the course of more than 20 preliminary semi-structured interviews with Chinese policy-makers and PSA producers it became clear that PSAs are *not* designed with a particular target audience in mind. Officials see PSA as “propaganda instruments” (*xuanchuan gongju*) aimed at “ordinary people” (*laobaixing*). None of the producers interviewed had a specific demographic or social group in mind, i.e., middle-aged women or factory workers, when creating PSAs. Instead, they indicated that they always sought to affect a wide audience (Stockmann 2011). It is likely that producers are indirectly influenced by the style that attracts target audiences of commercial advertising, including most importantly women, blue collar

workers, and the younger generation (Prendergast and Hwa 2003, Wang 2008). Since PSA are directed at ordinary people, however, we decided to recruit average citizens for our study.

To test the representativeness of key findings from the four focus groups we rely on the randomly sampled Survey on Citizen's Life (SCL) conducted by Horizon Market Research in collaboration with the Unirule Institute for Economics (*Tianze Jingji Yanjiusuo*). We designed and added questions about the liking of PSAs in comparison to commercial advertising as well as perceptions of the source of PSAs and evaluations of these perceptions.² The survey was conducted in 30 provinces during June 2010, starting only three weeks after the third and fourth focus group. Based on PPS random sampling, a total of 6577 people were interviewed within four municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), 22 capitals of provinces, and four major cities of autonomous regions (Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Guangxi).³ Survey respondents varied between 16 and 60 years of age and had to live in the city for at least one year. They were interviewed by professional interviewers and trained Chinese graduate students face-to-face and results were checked several times before release. The average response rate per city was 32 percent (s.d. = 19 percent).⁴ Due to PSS sampling, the sample underrepresented migrants, including 14.6 percent of respondents without local residency

² For the opportunity to collaborate on this ongoing survey we would like to thank Unirule and Horizon Market Research.

³ Among the four cities in autonomous regions, only the one in Xinjiang (Karamay) is not the city where the regional government is located. Sample size within each city depended on the city's size, varying between 150 and 300 people per city.

⁴ Due to the increase in market research and other polling institutes in China, response rates have been declining since the 1990s. Response rates were calculated for each city using a response rate calculator available on the website of the American Association of Public Opinion Research at www.aapor.org. For a recent review of survey methodology in China see Melanie Manion, "A Survey of Survey Research on Chinese Politics: What Have We Learned?," in *Comparative Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies*, ed. Allen Carlson, et al. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

permit (*hukou*). In terms of gender, education, income, and age, however, the sample was roughly comparable to census data.

Since this is one of the first studies in Chinese politics relying on the focus group method, we lay out in more detail the recruitment, design, and procedure of the four focus groups before we turn to empirical results.

Participants, Design and Procedure of Focus Groups

In order to learn about people's perceptions and interpretations of public service advertisements, we conducted four focus groups among different demographic groups in Beijing in the winter of 2009 and the summer of 2010. Focus groups are open-ended discussions involving small groups of people; ours ranged between 11 to 12 people in size. Participants were selected based on considerations regarding age, gender, and education – demographic characteristics that we expected could matter for perceptions and interpretation of PSAs. Focus group participants were selected who were similar with respect to one variable, while differing with respect to the others. This rationale of “controlling” for one variable while varying another allows us to develop hypotheses about whether and how different demographic characteristics matter for perceptions of PSAs.

Working in collaboration with the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, which recruited participants and provided a trained moderator, our goal was to use focus groups to understand how viewers with varying demographic, socioeconomic, and educational characteristics might respond differently to PSAs. Were PSAs perceived as propaganda? What did people approve of PSAs as a means of guiding

public opinion or educating citizens? Did the nature of sponsorship of PSAs (which organization was credited as the sponsor) affect the credibility of advertisements in the eyes of viewers? Did people believe PSA content and understand the process of PSA production and the intentions underlying PSA messages? How did people's perceptions of state-sponsored PSAs compare to perceptions of PSAs sponsored by corporations or even commercial advertisements?

Focus group sessions were led by a trained moderator, whose efforts were guided by a protocol consisting of instructions and a list of questions to be asked. (See the Appendix for a complete list of the questions asked.) It is the role of the moderator to stimulate conversation—ideally of the sort that avoids artificial consensus, prevent particularly vocal people from dominating the discussion, and encourage all participants to speak freely. Tea and snacks were provided to refresh participants, during conversations that lasted nearly two hours. At the conclusion of each session, participants filled out a questionnaire providing supplementary information prior to receiving compensation.

The atmosphere of focus groups is designed to be as informal as possible to facilitate free and relaxed conversation (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996: 82). To encourage honest self-expression, participants in focus groups are often given pseudonyms. We chose to permit people to use their real surnames, which gave participants both the feeling of familiarity, as well as the sense of anonymity, due to the fact that most Chinese surnames are commonly used. Our Chinese interlocutors also suggested that using real surnames would avoid awkwardness in conversations in the event people slipped and used their real names instead of a pseudonym.

Each session was videotaped and carefully transcribed by student researchers at the Communication University of China. The analysis below reflects repeated viewings of the videos by the authors prior to a lengthy review of the transcripts for each group. All translations of remarks made by participants have been checked by a native Chinese speaker for accuracy.

For the first group (henceforth G1), males and females were selected to participate in roughly equal proportions. A precise 50-50 split between the sexes was not seen as essential. All participants possessed a high-school level education, the average education level of long-term Beijing residents, with one exception: an individual was included whose education was cut short at the middle-school level due to the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Participants' ages varied from 19 to 71, due to the presumption that people's perceptions of PSAs may considerably vary by age, due to longer exposure to propaganda as a common form of political communication.

In the second group (G2), age was held constant between 38-41, the average age of long-term Beijing residents, while education levels varied widely from primary schooling to the post-graduate level. After reviewing the results of the first two focus groups, we noticed that women participated to a lesser degree than men, while in G2 women with high education levels participated at levels similar to well-educated men. Therefore, we selected only women aged 35-42, with lower than average education levels, including participants who had elementary, middle school, and high school educations for the third focus group (G3). The fourth group (G4) consisted of both men and women aged 35-42 with a university or advanced graduate degrees. We selected this demographic to sharpen

our understanding of the relationship between higher education and perceptions of propaganda.

After self-introductions, participants in the focus groups were asked basic questions about their television viewing inclinations. Our goal in doing so was to collect general information about individual participants while easing into discussions that became increasingly focused on topics of direct interest to our research. Midway through each focus group session, the moderator showed clips of PSAs, each of them shown in combination with a source label. As examples of PSA we selected three that differed in terms of the issue, but not in terms of quality or format. We selected PSAs related to issues of varying levels of political sensitivity, including one related to the relatively uncontroversial topic of environmental protection, one pertaining to efforts to reduce corruption among officials, and one designed to boost nationalism. For groups 2, 3 and 4, we added one concerning the promotion of proper moral conduct. This particular PSA differed in style from the first three as it relied less on story-telling similar to a commercial ad, but presented the slogan in pictures more similar to propaganda posters of the Mao period, as explained in detail below.

In order to ensure that quality of the ads was roughly equal to one another, we selected each public service advertisement from all of the provincial-level PSA that were submitted to the biannual national PSA competition organized by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce and Guidance Committee on Building Spiritual Civilization, a central level institution with close ties to the Chinese Communist Party Central Propaganda Department. Each of these ads (with the exception of one pertaining to proper moral conduct) includes a surprising turn of events near the end of

the ad. As explained in detail below, each ad starts with a visual narrative, but the true intention of the story is only subsequently revealed. Three of the four PSA were, therefore, similar with respect to quality in production and format, but different in terms of the content of their messages. The order of the ads was chosen randomly; so were the source labels attached to each of them. The order of the ads and source labels was once randomly determined and kept the same across all focus groups. None of the participants had ever watched any of the PSAs prior to participating in our study.

The first PSA displays a boy practicing the movements of raising the national flag on a table cloth hanging from a laundry line. He later raises the flag at school with a dramatic music playing in the background. The attribution following the ad indicates the sponsor was China Central Television (CCTV), the country's national television monopoly.

The second PSA portrays a group of 15 children arm wrestling after school. One small bespectacled boy defeats all opponents and is later shown turning off dripping faucets. The resulting exercise, a viewer assumes, is the source of his hidden strength. The sentence, "I want to conserve water" then appears prior to the sponsor's name, Haier, a major corporation producing household electronics.

The third PSA shows the hands of a bureaucrat on a black desk. The bureaucrat is presented with a document, which is rejected, until a gift appears, whereupon the document receives a stamp of approval. Next, documents accompanied by a wrist watch, a credit card, and car keys receive approval. The next items are a pair of handcuffs and an arrest notice that is stamped "I approve." The bureaucrats hands are then shown cuffed while a melodious voice says "oppose corruption and promote clean government, know

honor and illuminate disgrace.” The four sponsoring organizations are the Central Office of Spiritual Civilization (a branch of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party), the National Commerce Administration, the National Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, and the General Administration of Press and Publications.

For G2-G4, we included one PSA that propagates “the Eight Desirables and Eight Undesirables,” a slogan of the Hu Jintao presidency, in order to be able to compare to more traditional forms of propaganda that rely less on marketing techniques. This fourth PSA depicted a montage of heroic efforts, including those of the People’s Liberation Army set to dramatic music. The narrator’s voice announces the political slogan advocated by the administration of President Hu Jintao, “the Eight Desirables and Eight Undesirables,” which concerns the dos and don’ts of moral conduct. The eight moral points, assumed to be understood by viewers, are: 1. love the motherland, don’t harm it; 2. serve, don’t disserve the people; 3. uphold science, don’t be ignorant and unenlightened; 4. work hard, don’t be lazy; 5. be united and help each other, don’t benefit at the expense of others; 6. be honest, not profit-mongering; 7. be disciplined and law-abiding, not chaotic and lawless; 8. know plain living and hard struggle, do not wallow in luxury.⁵

Knowledge and Understanding of PSAs

Focus Group Results

Early in each focus group session the moderator asked participants what sorts of advertisements people had watched recently or had found particularly enjoyable. She also

⁵ Translation is from [Sharp, 2006]. http://csimpson80.com/new_page_711.htm accessed on March 21, 2010.

asked people whether they believed the messages in advertisements they could remember. We employed this strategy to get a sense for how people viewed commercial advertisements and to see if people mentioned having seen PSAs on television without any prompting.

Prior to any mention of public service advertisements by the moderator, three participants recalled PSAs they had seen in the past as commercial ads. One participant in G2, a worker in a cosmetic company surnamed Wu, volunteered that she had seen an advertisement with the jingle “one small step for love is one great step for moral growth.” Wu also recalled a second PSA that depicted a child on the beach playing with building blocks; the ad was accompanied by the slogan “use labor to build a beautiful future.” One participant in G4, a teacher surnamed Zhu, said he had liked a PSA he had seen three years before related to planting trees; a second participant, a PhD candidate surnamed Meng, remarked that PSAs left a deep impression. These comments served as an initial indication of awareness of PSAs as well as the sense that, at least for some participants, PSAs had left a lasting impact. By comparison, most participants were critical of commercial advertisements, seeing them as disruptive, overly frequent, untrustworthy, and oriented toward profits, rather than public interest.

The moderator had been instructed to broach the topic of PSAs with the question: “What is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the words ‘public service advertisement?’” Participants quickly recalled PSAs related to such topics as respect for the elderly, AIDS awareness, opposing political corruption, promotion of the Beijing Olympics, improvement of moral standards, avoidance of littering and smoking, garbage disposal, and water and energy conservation. Two participants even mentioned a PSA

featuring the actor Pu Cunxi concerning the merits of PSAs as a “bright lantern” (*yizhan deng*) to shed light on matters of concern for society.

Many participants asserted that PSAs were infrequent, “too few” or too brief, seldom repetitive, “believable” or “100 percent believable,” and largely “healthy.” One participant in G1, a 39-year-old accountant, Wang, said he tried to watch PSAs completely when they aired: “PSAs are primarily directed toward talking about and solving social problems.”

Statistical Results

As focus group participants, the overwhelming majority of urban residents have been exposed to the concept of a PSA. To analyze who has heard about PSAs before, we rely on a question that asked whether the respondent had heard about PSAs before. Since the previous question asked about television advertisement, respondents were primed to think about television PSAs. If respondents indicated to have heard of PSAs, her answer was coded as one, otherwise as zero. In our sample, 88.5 percent had heard about PSAs before, 11.5 percent had not.⁶

Exposure to commercials, education, and age are important factors influencing whether a person reported to have been exposed to the concept before. To assess exposure to commercial advertising we rely on the question: “When you last watched television and encountered commercials did you watch all commercials, most of them, some of them, or none?.”

Since we employ multivariate probit maximum likelihood regression analysis, it is helpful to compare the respective impact of these variables when holding all other control

⁶ Note that we are not using this question as a measure for PSA reception, but as a measure for whether people have been exposed to the concept of PSAs.

variables constant at the mean or mode. We calculated likelihoods for respondents with a local hukou, not being a CCP member, not working at a state unit, being average in terms of family income, and located in a city, average in size and GDP-level in a province with sub-provincial level (*fu sheng ji shi*). For such an “average” Chinese urban resident exposure and education increases a person’s likelihood to have heard about PSAs before, while age decreases it. With respect to these three independent variables, we detect curvilinear relationships, whereby the relationship is reduced at higher levels of exposure to commercials, education, and age, which became more and less pronounced depending on gender. Detailed statistical results are presented in Table 1.

When distinguishing between men and women, we detect significantly different relationships of each of these variables, depending on the gender of the respondent. The figures below display the relationship between exposure, education, and age within two standard deviations from the sample mean (displayed in the middle of the x-axis). As shown in Figure 1, women tend to be less susceptible to commercials at lower levels of exposure than men, but men tend to be slightly more resistant to commercials at high levels of exposure compared to women.

Insert Figure 1 about here

In terms of education, women tend to be less likely than men to have heard PSAs at low levels of education, but at high levels of education gender differences become insignificant (see Figure 2).

Insert Figure 2 about here

With respect to age, young women tend to be significantly less likely to have heard about PSAs compared to young men, but this gender gap is reduced with age, resulting even in a greater likelihood among women to have been exposed to the concept in their late 50s (see Figure 3).

Insert Figure 3 about here

In sum, broadcasting of television PSAs significantly contributes to urban residents' exposure to the concept of PSAs, but the impact of exposure can be reduced or strengthened, depending on a person's education, age, and gender.

Interpretation of PSA Content

Focus Group Results

Following a discussion about public service advertising, the moderator was instructed to show each group the PSAs mentioned above concerning nationalism, water conservation, opposing corruption, and the "Eight Desirables and Eight Undesirables" about the improvement of moral conduct. Every advertisement was then discussed at length and ads were shown a second time upon request by participants.

While it was clear that most viewers grasped the basic meaning of the advertisements, people perceived the aims and target audience of the PSAs differently. People with lower education levels tended to interpret the advertisements in which children were actors as

targeted toward children, rather than a general audience. This finding was surprising, considering that producers of PSAs design ads for a general audience.

In evaluating the PSA that depicted the boy raising the national flag, Shu, a 30-year-old saleswoman from rural Anhui province in G1 noted, “This is to advocate children to have these (patriotic) thoughts from their youth.” In G3, 41-year-old Wang, a saleswoman argued, “this ad should be shown to children, not to adults;” the 36-year-old Beijing resident Yang, who works in commercial investment (*zhaoshang*), said “the ad wants to tell children that no matter what they do they must work hard.” Du, a 66-year-old retired carpenter in G1 observed, “This makes children love the flag and the country.”

Some more highly educated viewers in G2 and G4, however, understood that the PSA on nationalism was designed for a broader audience and were somewhat critical of the message. In G2, Liu, a college-educated teacher, described the ad as “clearly an especially low-class form of education... you don’t need to say ‘love the country’ and they will love the country. If you raise the flag there, will they love the country? If you can’t give me a wonderful life that makes me proud, how can I love the country?” In G4, Zhen, remarked that the PSA was “impossible. Children and then such a big topic. It is not too appropriate.” These results suggest that the less educated have a more literal understanding of PSAs while more highly educated tend to evaluate PSA content more critically.

A similar perception of the target audience for PSAs appeared when people with lower education levels (high-school level or below) evaluated the anti-corruption PSA, which was seen as produced to discourage corruption among officials, instead of influencing the views of ordinary people (*laobaixing*). For example, 31-year-old Chen in

G1 asserted that the corruption ad was not for the public but aimed at a specific group—officials and people with power. In G2, Cao, a 41-year-old accountant from a small village in Jiangsu said “I think (the ad) would have a good impact if you showed that group of people (officials). It would scare them a little.” This understanding differed from the view of public officials who stated during interviews that anti-corruption ads should induce officials to take less bribes, but also ordinary people to give less bribes.

Support for PSAs

Focus Group Results

Most focus group participants disliked commercial advertisements, seeing them as disruptive, overly frequent, untrustworthy, and oriented toward profits, rather than public interest. PSAs, by comparison, were seen much more favorably, except by a small number of participants with a college education or higher who believed they could be unacceptable, one-sided, or were directed toward increasing popular support for the political regime.

One participant, a 39-year-old accountant, Wang, said he tried to watch PSAs completely when they aired. “PSAs are primarily directed toward talking about and solving social problems,” he noted. When asked to compare PSAs and commercial ads, Wang said the former do not contain as much “crazy commercial stuff.” Everyone in Group 1, which did not include college-educated participants, stressed that they believed the content of PSAs. Four participants in G1 noted that PSAs “are always well done,” or that “they are really good.”

Support for the anti-corruption PSA, which respondents were led to believe was sponsored by four central-level institutions, was strong among members of all four groups. Wang, a 39-year-old accountant from Jiangxi Province in G1, said “This is a good thing.” In G2, 41-year-old Liu concurred, “This is pretty good. If broadcast on television I think it would have a pretty good effect. He observed that the anti-corruption would have been better if the bureaucrat had been executed. Even 41-year-old Zhang, who in an earlier comment had suggested that everyone rejects traditionally dogmatic forms of party propaganda, remarked “I think this is acceptable.” The 41-year-old Yang in G2, remarked to the derision of many: “corrupt officials attract the people’s hatred (*tangguan zhaoren hen*).” In G3, Li noted with dismay, “in our society there are now many leaders who are like this.”

Interestingly, the fourth ad pertaining to Hu Jintao’s slogan “the Eight Desirables and Eight Undesirables” was unpopular compared to the other PSAs. It appeared that this may have been due primarily to the ad’s portrayal of a complex political message through a rapid sequence of moving images that was intended to evoke a sense of heroism. In G2, Zhang, who is a professor of political science at Peking University, and Liu, the college-educated teacher, said they “certainly wouldn’t be able to remember it.” Hu, an engineer from Jiangxi Province, said the “train of thought (*silu*) was too disorganized.” Ms. Zhang, a 41-year-old from Liaoning Province, said “the logic was just too confused.”

The most supportive views of “the Eight Desirables and Eight Undesirables” PSA were voiced in G3, the group composed entirely of women with lower than average education levels. Yang, the 36-year-old from Beijing, said “the ad concerns a good

aspiration... no matter who brings up the ‘Eight Desirables and Eight Undesirables’ she has a better aspiration that she hopes everyone can reach.” Gu, a 43-year-old hotel employee from Shaanxi Province, remarked that the PSA “tells you ... what is correct and what is incorrect, what is good and what should not be done.” Zhou, a 37-year-old from Hebei Province, remarked “This is pretty good. It educates people and makes them have this consciousness.” Other members of G4 cautioned, however, that living up to the high standards of the Eight Desirables and Eight Undesirables would be difficult or even impossible.

After discussing each advertisement, the moderator asked participants what they saw as the relationship between PSAs and propaganda. When designing the focus group protocol, we had hoped that this question would shed light on both perceptions of propaganda question seemed natural in the context of the focus groups because, without prompting, participants mentioned propaganda, related PSAs to propaganda, or suggested that PSAs were a form of propaganda. The results were illustrative of how authoritarian forms of political communication and on whether or not people saw PSAs as a form of propaganda. They have evolved in contemporary China.

On the main, it was difficult for people with below average education (high-school level education or lower) to consider propaganda as a concept and to compare it to PSAs. The responses of people with university or post-graduate educations were more helpful for understanding the similarities and differences between propaganda and PSAs. For Ms. Zhang from Liaoning Province, propaganda differed from PSAs in the sense that “xuanchuan” connoted a forceful style of communication that was unidirectional, designed to change behavior, and intended to tap into an individual’s desires. Zhen, a 41-

year-old information technology specialist in G4, said “the ultimate aim (of PSAs) is the same as propaganda but the method is different.” Zhen saw propaganda as a governmental means of using laws and social pressure to control the actions of citizens. Propaganda is a broader concept whereas PSAs “educate people to learn to love and learn to care about their environment and the personal relationships in their own lives. The point of departure of (propaganda and PSAs) is different.” The PhD candidate, Meng, responded to Zhen’s comment with the remark that “Of course it seems as if their purpose is the same.” Several G4 participants chimed in that they shared these views, including including 41-year-old He, an engineer, who said that “PSAs are indistinguishable from propaganda.”

Most participants who could speak to the relationship between propaganda and PSAs found the two to be quite similar in terms of the underlying objectives of both forms of political communication. Unlike propaganda, PSAs were seen as performing an advisory role, but a role that was useful for raising moral standards and addressing important social and political problems. PSAs, therefore, appeared to represent an key innovation by the government to guide public opinion in a polity where ideological conformity is no longer mandatory, but where heightened public awareness of issues—such as the need to love the country, conserve resources, or fight corruption—were seen as beneficial to the body politic.

Statistical Results

To assess support for PSAs we explicitly compared it with commercial advertising, as we did in the focus groups. Respondents were asked whether they fully agreed, somewhat agreed, agreed (*yi ban*), somewhat disagreed, or completely disagreed with the following

statements: first, “I wish television stations would broadcast less commercial advertising,” and second, “I wish television stations would broadcast less PSAs.” Responses were coded to run from 1 to 5, whereby higher numbers represent greater disagreement with the respective statement, or respective liking of PSAs or commercial ads. To assess the variable *PSA support* we subtract liking of commercials from liking of PSAs, such that higher numbers represent greater support for PSA broadcasting in comparison to commercials and lower number less support for PSAs in comparison to commercial broadcasting. The scale ran from -4 to + 4. People liked, on average, PSAs better than commercials (mean = 1.41; s.d. = 1,53), which is consistent with our focus groups.

As in the focus groups, we discovered that respondents agreed, on average, that television stations should broadcast less commercial ads, but the same was not true for PSAs: on average, people somewhat disagreed with this statement (see Figure 4).⁷

Insert Figure 4 about here

We were particularly interested in the relationship between the perceived source of PSAs and our variable *PSA support* that allows us to evaluate a person’s support for PSA in comparison to support for commercial advertising. Since this variable is a continuous variable, we employ multivariate OLS regression analysis to analyze the relationship between believing that PSAs are initiated by party and state units, NGOs, TV stations, or corporations. In addition to these dummy variables, we also added a dummy variable for

⁷ Support for commercial ads was, on average = 2.06 (s.d. = 0.99); support for PSAs was, on average = 3.47 (s.d. = 1.12).

those respondents who had an accurate understanding of the sources of PSAs, which can vary between all four of these actors. Control variables were consistent with the previous statistical analysis. As before, we rely on figures to interpret statistical findings. Detailed statistical results are displayed in Table 2.

Insert Figure 5 about here

Results show that there is a significant relationship between source perceptions and PSA support. As people consider PSAs to be more closely related to the party-state, they become more supportive of PSAs in comparison to commercial ads. That is, they perceive a greater difference between PSAs as opposed to commercials and view PSAs more positively compared to commercials. Urban residents are the most supportive when believing that PSAs are initiated by party or state units, followed by social organizations, and TV stations. Since social organizations and television stations have to be registered with state or party units, they remain incorporated into the Chinese political system and are, at most, semi-independent from the Chinese party-state (see, for example, Zhao 1998, Saich , Li 2002, Teets). Those who have accurate knowledge of PSA sources are roughly as supportive as those who believe social organizations constitute the main source behind PSAs. Only when PSAs are closely associated with corporations do they become less supportive of PSAs, but these results are not statistically significant

Perception of the Source and Support for State Initiation

Focus Group Results

Participants in G1-4 generally enjoyed the PSA promoting water conservation, an issue that has been emphasized for more than a decade in state propaganda, although a few people were troubled by the fact that it was sponsored by a major corporation. In G1, Wang, a 39-year-old accountant from Jiangxi Province, said “This gives you the feeling that it is a commercial advertisement. Why does the (company) name have to appear here?” Du, a retired carpenter, replied “This is excusable. The name appears because (the company) donated financial support for the (ad).” Wang continued to protest, however, arguing that the appearance of the name “Haier” “erased” the effectiveness of the ad. Mr. Chen, a 29-year-old technician from Hubei province agreed, “You have a good feeling during the first half of the ad but in the second half all of the good feeling disappears.” Liu, the 39-year-old college-educated teacher retorted, “That is a commercial ad.” Yet four other participants in G1 asserted that the ad was a PSA that had been sponsored by Haier. According to Du, the PSAs aim was “water conservation.” On the whole, the reactions to corporate sponsorship of the water conservation PSA suggests that some people believe strongly that it is the role of the government, or even television stations, and not corporations to produce PSAs capable of guiding public opinion.

Statistical Results

To assess *perceptions of the source* of PSAs we asked respondents “in your opinion, which organization (*jigou*) initiates the production of television PSAs?” Respondents were given the choices of television stations, commercial enterprises, party and state units, social organizations (*shehui gongyi zuzhi*); interviewers were instructed to also

record volunteered answers by respondents which did not clearly fit into any of these categories. In particular, we were interested in responses indicating either that four organizations usually work together to initiate PSAs or that each of these four organizations sometimes initiate PSAs and initiation was not limited to only one. Only this last statement is an accurate description of the actual circumstances: in China, all work units have the right to initiate PSAs; in addition to party and state units, television stations, social organizations, and corporations have in the past taken initiative to produce PSAs campaigns (Stockmann 2011). We created dummy variables for each of these response categories.

In addition, we asked respondents to evaluate the perceived sources, asking “do you think it is reasonable/acceptable/fair (*he li*) that they (the organization believed to initiate PSAs) initiate PSAs?” Respondents were given a choice of three answers: reasonable, unreasonable, and “I don’t care” (*wu suo wei*). Based on the perceived origin of PSAs, we created a series of dummy variables coded as one if a person believed PSAs were initiated by state or party units, corporations, and television, and evaluated this circumstance as reasonable. We call these variables “support of initiation by party or state unites, corporations, and TV stations,” respectively.

Similar to the focus groups, we discovered that most people do not have a clear idea who is behind PSAs. Only 12.9 percent had an accurate impression that state and party units, television stations, social organizations, and commercial enterprises each initiate PSAs individually. 30.7 percent of respondents believed social organizations initiated PSAs, 30.2 percent selected television stations, 10.7 percent party and state units, 7

percent commercial enterprises, and one percent volunteered that advertising companies initiated PSAs; about 5 percent openly admitted not to be sure (*shuo bu qing*).

Do people care about knowing who initiates PSAs? According to our data, yes. Only a minority of 23.7 percent reported that it did not matter to them which organization initiated PSAs. Among the remaining 76.3 percent, most people supported the source they perceived to be responsible for PSAs, though we detected some criticism among people who believed that PSAs were initiated by corporations, just as in our focus groups. About 21 percent of those who perceived corporations as the initiator of PSAs were not supportive; by comparison, only 4.7 percent of those who believed party or state units initiated PSAs expressed not to support this situation—a result that mirrored strong support for the anti-corruption PSA in focus groups; support for television stations as PSA sources fell in between these two (see Figure 6).

Insert Figure 6 about here

Who is particularly likely to be supportive of the party-state in comparison to corporations and TV stations as initiator of PSAs? Because of the comparatively small number of people who had heard about PSAs, cared about PSA sources, and shared these source perceptions, our results are less conclusive about this question; nevertheless, we detected differences in terms of age and education among respondents. As before, we employ multivariate probit maximum likelihood regression on three dummy variables, indicating support for party and state units, corporations, or TV stations as initiators of PSAs. Control variables were consistent with the previous statistical analysis. As before,

we calculated likelihoods for the “average” urban resident in our sample and visualized our findings in figures. Each of these figures shows the marginal effect of the independent variable and support for initiation by a specific source, whereby the x-axis displays changes in the independent variable within a distance of two standard deviations from the sample mean (in the middle of the x-axis). Detailed statistical results are displayed in Table 3.

Results show that those average urban residents with middle school, high school, and technical college education were somewhat more likely than those with only elementary or college education to support the party-state as a source of PSAs. People who only attended elementary education were about 25 percent less likely than those who attended high school to be supportive; college graduates were about 14 percent less likely to express support. Here, our findings differ from previous studies on the relationship between education and support of the Chinese political system, which did not detect any relationship among urban residents or entrepreneurs (Chen, et al. 1997, Chen and Dickson 2008, Kennedy 2009).⁸ This is so, because we are examining support for engagement of the state in propaganda activities rather than more general evaluations of institutions and the political system.

Insert Figure 7 about here

⁸ Others have argued that education indirectly influences regime support through values Tianjian Shi, "Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan," *Comparative Politics* 33, no. 4 (2001).; in rural China, researchers have detected a linear negative or nonlinear positive relationship with political trust or satisfaction Lianjiang Li, "Political Trust in Rural China," *Modern China* 30, no. 2 (2004), John James Kennedy, "Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled Media," *Political Studies* 57, no. 3 (2009)..

Compared to education, age is more strongly related to support for initiation by commercial enterprises. People in their thirties, who were born in the 1970s and socialized during the 1980s, are strongly more supportive of involvement of corporations in PSA production than earlier or later generations. An 18 year-old is 60 percent less likely to be supportive and a 60 year-old 48 percent less likely compared to a 38 year-old. People who were socialized during the early years of reform tend to be more supportive of economic forces, while later generations have been socialized during a period where social problems accompanying the reforms became more apparent, thus voicing less support for commercial enterprises. These results confirm previous findings that generations socialized during the 1990s and later are, in fact, strikingly similar to those socialized pre-1978 (Stockmann 2010).

Insert Figure 8 about here

Similarly, age turns out to be more strongly related to support for initiation of PSAs by TV stations than education. Yet compared to corporations, especially the younger generation tends to be more supportive of the idea that TV stations initiate PSAs. In this case, 18 year-olds are only about 8 percent less supportive, while 60 year-olds tend to express about 19 percent less support for TV stations as initiators of PSAs.

Insert Figure 9 about here

Overall, these findings from the statistical analysis confirm the general conclusions we drew from our four focus groups, namely that people are familiar with PSAs, support state initiation of PSAs, and tend to disapprove of corporate initiation of PSAs. The statistical analysis also revealed differences nuanced attitudes toward PSAs only hinted at in the focus group discussions. Our survey data suggested that more educated respondents were somewhat more open to corporate initiation of PSAs—a view that was less pronounced in focus groups in which people discussed the sponsorship by Haier of the PSA related to water conservation. It is possible that when people discussed the concrete example of Haier’s sponsorship of a PSA related indirectly to consumer products the company manufactures (i.e. washing machines) that participants became more cognizant of potential conflicts of interest or saw Haier’s sponsorship of the water conservation PSA as hypocritical.

Surveys also showed that respondents with very low education levels (primary schooling) or high education levels (college educations) were less supportive of state sponsorship of PSAs than people with more average education levels (middle school, high school, and technical college education). Intuitively, these results make sense in light of the fact that Chinese with low education levels may feel more dispossessed than better educated respondents by inequalities resulting from China’s embrace of capitalism. The poorly educated may wish for empowerment through greater involvement by citizens in PSA production. The comparatively weaker support for state initiation among college educated Chinese could reflect some concern with state dominance over propaganda and a desire for more space for non-governmental organizations or other groups to promote issues of concern to society, but not necessarily to the party-state. Comments made by a

few highly educated participants in focus groups support this conclusion: some focus group participants indicated a preference for PSA production by citizen groups and NGOs in addition to PSAs sponsored by state institutions.

Conclusion

Our research suggests that decades of CCP rule have normalized state sponsorship of “propaganda,” a word that does not have a negative connotation for many Chinese. PSAs pertaining to issues that the public supports, such as combating corruption or promoting water conservation, are seen as beneficial attempts to heighten awareness of major problems facing society. Chinese seldom challenge the state’s role as the advocate of a higher political consciousness. Few people, however, appear to understand the complex relationship between the government, the CCP, and corporations that facilitates the broadcasting of PSAs. Our findings imply that societal support for propaganda in authoritarian regimes merits greater scholarly consideration. Perceptions of PSAs among urban Chinese suggest that many citizens unknowingly cede power to the state to guide public opinion through authoritarian communication, a capacity that contributes to the political resilience of the Chinese party-state. Support for propaganda in China reflects the public’s distrust of market forces as well as the continuing belief that central-level party and state institutions remain equipped to deal with many of the country’s pressing political challenges.

Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Exposure to Commercials on Having Heard about PSAs among Women and Men




Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Education on Having Heard about PSAs among Women and Men




Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Age on Having Heard about PSAs among Women and Men




Figure 4. Support for PSAs in Comparison to Commercial Advertisements




Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Source Perception on PSA Support




Figure 6. Evaluation of Perceived Source of PSAs (among those who care about PSA sources)




Figure 7. Marginal Effect of Education on Support for Initiation by Party or State Unit (among those who care about PSA sources)




Figure 8. Marginal Effect of Age on Support for Initiation by Corporations (among those who care about PSA sources)




Figure 9. Marginal Effect of Age on Support for Initiation by TV Stations (among those who care about PSA sources)




Table 1. Multivariate Probit Regression Analysis on Having Heard about PSAs⁹

<i>Dependent Variable:</i> Having Heard about PSAs (Dummy Variable)			
	Coefficient (s.d.)		
	<i>Among all Respondents</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>
<i>Independent Variables:</i>			
Exposure to Commercials	1.432*** (0.25)	1.232*** (0.364)	1.625*** (0.347)
Exposure to Commercials Squared	-1.060*** (0.271)	-0.747* (0.392)	-1.369*** (0.38)
Educational Degree	1.108*** (0.162)	1.176*** (0.228)	1.047*** (0.231)
Age	-0.203** (0.093)	-0.075 (0.131)	-0.330** (0.132)
Female	-0.089** (0.044)	--	--
Non-local Hukou	-0.223*** (0.062)	-0.189** (0.087)	-0.249*** (0.087)
CCP Member	0.059 (0.095)	0.109 (0.154)	0.045 (0.121)
Work at State Unit	0.204 (0.214)	0.473 (0.349)	0.03 (0.279)
Family income	-0.02 (0.168)	-0.074 (0.23)	0.076 (0.247)
Size of City	0.055 (0.177)	-0.024 (0.243)	0.164 (0.261)
Municipality	-0.009 (0.129)	-0.034 (0.177)	0.022 (0.19)
Prefecture-level City	0.096* (0.044)	0.031 (0.044)	0.166** (0.044)

⁹ To facilitate interpretation of the intercept, all independent and control variables were coded to run from zero to one, such that higher values indicate higher levels of exposure, education, age, and being female.

	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.08)
Autonomous Region	0.125	0.123	0.127
	(0.083)	(0.111)	(0.125)
GDP of Province, Autonomous Regions, or Municipality	0.142	0.115	0.149
	(0.122)	(0.163)	(0.188)
Constant	0.569***	0.497***	0.527***
	(0.136)	(0.188)	(0.193)
N	6,103	3,156	2,947
Pseudo R2	0.04	0.04	0.05

z-value *** z<0.01; ** z<0.05; * z<0.1;

Table 2. Multivariate OLS Regression Analysis on PSA Support¹⁰

<i>Independent Variables:</i>	<i>Dependent Variable:</i> PSA Support		
	<i>Among all Respondents</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>
Accurate Source Perception	0.529*** (0.075)	0.417*** (0.102)	0.669*** (0.111)
Perception of Party and State Units as Source	0.722*** (0.078)	0.667*** (0.11)	0.781*** (0.111)
Perception of TV as Source	0.147** (0.06)	0.142* (0.082)	0.150* (0.088)
Perception of NGOs as Source	0.515*** (0.06)	0.475*** (0.082)	0.559*** (0.087)
Perception of Corporations as Source	-0.119 (0.09)1	-0.216* (0.127)	-0.019 (0.13)
Exposure to Commercials	-0.515*** (0.09)	-0.561*** (0.127)	-0.463*** (0.128)
Educational Degree	0.076 (0.14)	0.181 (0.201)	-0.034 (0.196)
Age	0.036 (0.083)	0.115 (0.12)	-0.039 (0.115)
Female	0.004 (0.039)	--	--
Non-local Hukou	-0.031 (0.058)	0.039 (0.084)	-0.087 (0.08)
CCP Member	0.086 (0.077)	-0.035 (0.125)	0.177* (0.099)
Work at State Unit	-0.143	0.165	-0.457**

¹⁰ To facilitate interpretation of the intercept, all independent and control variables were coded to run from zero to one, such that higher values indicate higher levels of exposure, education, age, and being female.

	(0.163)	(0.235)	(0.229)
Family income	-0.381**	-0.489**	-0.236
	(0.149)	(0.208)	(0.215)
Size of City	0.993***	1.013***	0.996***
	(0.159)	(0.223)	(0.228)
Municipality	-0.710***	-0.802***	-0.615***
	(0.113)	(0.16)	(0.162)
Prefecture-level City	0.101**	0.114*	0.082
	(0.049)	(0.069)	(0.07)
Autonomous Region	-0.243***	-0.183*	-0.324***
	(0.07)	(0.096)	(0.104)
GDP of Province, Autonomous Regions, or Municipality	-0.211*	-0.173	-0.280*
	(0.11)	(0.151)	(0.161)
Constant	1.393***	1.423***	1.342***
	(0.125)	(0.172)	(0.175)
N	5,976	3,091	2,885
R2	0.05	0.05	0.06

p-value *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1;

Table 3. Multivariate Probit Regression Analysis on Support for Initiation of PSAs by the Party-State, Corporations, and TV Stations (among those who care about PSA sources)¹¹

	<i>Dependent Variable: Support of Initiation by Party or State Units (Dummy Variable)</i>	<i>Dependent Variable: Support of Initiation by Corporations (Dummy Variable)</i>	<i>Dependent Variable: Support of Initiation by TV Stations (Dummy Variable)</i>
	Coefficient (s.d.)	Coefficient (s.d.)	Coefficient (s.d.)
Exposure to Commercials	-0.161 (0.504)	0.281 (0.427)	-0.208 (0.236)
Educational Degree	3.774* (2.157)	-4.202 (2.881)	-1.126 (1.319)
Educational Degree Squared	-4.619* (2.419)	3.805 (3.303)	0.404 (1.521)
Age	2.434 (1.551)	2.720* (1.445)	1.411* (0.783)
Age Squared	-2.271 (1.561)	-2.903** (1.391)	-1.848** (0.731)
Female	-0.041 (0.22)	0.136 (0.196)	-0.065 (0.111)
Non-local Hukou	-0.393 (0.257)	-0.245 (0.282)	-0.173 (0.164)
CCP Member	0.295 (0.449)	0.528 (0.342)	0.072 (0.215)
Family income	-0.936 (0.787)	0.161 (0.652)	0.481 (0.433)
Size of City	-1.14 (0.918)	-2.334** (0.948)	-1.257*** (0.461)
Municipality	1.138 (0.74)	3.069*** (0.793)	0.45 (0.323)

¹¹ To facilitate interpretation of the intercept, all independent and control variables were coded to run from zero to one, such that higher values indicate higher levels of exposure, education, age, and being female.

Prefecture-level City	0.275 (0.266)	0.151 (0.229)	0.295** (0.143)
Autonomous Region	0.43 (0.418)	0.158 (0.453)	-0.439** (0.199)
GDP of Province, Autonomous Region, or Municipality	0.742 (0.671)	0.003 (0.629)	1.088*** (0.357)
Constant	1.190* (0.718)	1.146 (0.772)	1.436*** (0.423)
N	481	269	1,275
Pseudo R2	0.11	0.16	0.07

z-value *** z<0.01; ** z<0.05; * z<0.1;

Appendix: Focus Group Protocol (Chinese)

焦点小组访谈实施方案

本部分的目标是调查在一个媒介日益发达的社会中，中国居民如何评价他们从政府和市场所获得的信息。这一实施方案希望研究中国居民如何解读由政府赞助的公益广告的内容。

本部分研究要求在介绍每个参与者时使用化名。谈话过程应该是轻松、随意和自然流畅的；每个参与者都要回答第一个问题，但并非每个人都要回答后面的所有问题。提问者应该向参与者问出下列的每一个问题，但不一定需要严格按照这里所给出的顺序来提问。

1. 他们最喜欢的电视节目类型是什么？他们昨天看电视了吗？看了什么内容？他们每天平均看多久电视？
2. 在看电视时，遇到播放广告，你会怎么做？（1、2题，控制在6~8分）
3. 你记得上一次看电视时电视上播放了什么广告吗？
4. 你为什么会记住这些广告？
5. 总的来说，你相不相信这些广告的内容？（3~5题，控制在12分钟）
6. 当你听到“公益广告”这个词时，你首先想到的是什么？
7. 你觉得商业广告和公益广告有什么区别吗？
8. 当你在电视上看到一条公益广告时，你能知道它是公益广告吗？

9. 你能记得上一次看电视时看到的公益广告吗？你相不相信公益广告的内容？

分别播放一个国家制作的公益广告、电视台制作的和一个商业赞助的公益广告，然后请参与者回答下列问题：

10. 这些广告的目的是什么？
11. 你在看完以上三条广告后，是否有不同的感觉？如果是的话，将来再看到类似的公益广告会让你们改变自己的想法或者习惯吗？
12. 你知道是谁在赞助电视上播放的公益广告吗？他们为什么要赞助这些公益广告？（提问者不能代替参与者回答，或给他们任何提示）
13. 你认为公益广告常见吗？请选择：1）非常少见；2）少见；3）有时能见到；4）常见；5）非常常见
14. 为什么你会这样想？

讨论结果

15. 你认为商业广告和公益广告在制作质量上有差别吗？由公司制作的公益广告的制作质量如何？
16. 你觉得“公益广告”和“宣传”有什么关系？你觉得应该由谁来做？
17. 你觉得“公益广告”是不是“宣传”？为什么？
18. 你希望看到什么内容的公益广告？

解释说明：

访问结束后，请主持人向参加访问的人解释我们项目的背景，请特别说明以下四点：

1. 我们是谁？

此次研究是中国传媒大学与荷兰莱顿大学相关学者共同申请的荷兰皇家科学院与中国教育部共同组织的“中荷科学合作中国交换项目”。具体的研究题目是“中国公益广告的基本原理、内容及效果研究”。

2. 为什么要做这项研究？

我们希望了解中国公益广告的发展过程，主要内容，以及传播效果。

3. 公益广告的定义。

公益广告是为公众利益服务的非商业性广告，旨在以倡导或警示等方式传播某种公益观念，促进社会精神文明建设。中国的公益广告大多数是由政府部门发起，由电视台和广告公司合作完成，由商业企业赞助完成的。

4. 访谈结束后，请主持人向被访者特别强调，访谈中给他们看的公益广告是经过我们改编的，其中内容是曾经在电视台播出过的，但后面的标志是我们随机增加的，请他们不要与电视上真实播出的公益广告相混淆。

Focus Group Protocol (English)

The moderator must ask each of the questions below, although not necessarily in the exact order specified here:

1. What is your favorite type of television program? Do you watch television yesterday? What did you watch? How much TV do you watch on average per day?
2. When you are watching television and an advertisement airs what do you do?
3. Do you or remember any advertisements from the recent television viewing session?
4. Why did you remember about the advertisements?
5. Generally speaking, do you trust the content of advertisements?
6. What is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the word “public service announcement?”
7. Can you tell the difference between a commercial advertisement and a PSA?
8. Do you recognize a public interest announcement on television when they see one?

9. Does anyone remember the public interest announcements from the recent viewing session?

PSAs shown and participants are asked the following questions:

10. What is the purpose of these announcements?
11. Do you feel differently about XX (insert the subjects of each of the two PSAs) after viewing the advertisement? If so, will seeing similar PSAs in the future remind them to change their thinking or habits?
12. Do you know who sponsors public interest announcements on television? Why do they sponsor them? (*Moderator cannot answer on behalf of participants or give hints.*)
13. Do you think PSA are common?
14. Do you think there is a difference in the production quality between commercial advertisements and PSAs? What about PSAs sponsored by corporations?
15. What is your attitude about public service announcements? Please rank your answers from one to five with one being: 1) very opposed to them 2) don't really care 3) some usefulness 4) necessary 5) very important
16. What do you think if the relationship between PSAs and propaganda? Who do you think should do these activities?
17. Are PSAs propaganda? Why?
18. What kind of PSA content would you like to see?

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